Detecting and Forecasting Economic Regimes in Automated Exchanges by unknown
1We present basic building blocks of an agent that can use observable market conditions to
characterize the microeconomic conditions of the market and predict future market trends. The
agent can use this information to make both tactical decisions such as pricing and strategic
decisions such as product mix and production planning. We develop methods that can learn
dominant market conditions, such as over-supply or scarcity, from historical data using compu-
tational methods to construct price density functions. We discuss how this knowledge can be
used, together with real-time observable information, to identify the current dominant market
condition and to forecast market changes over a planning horizon. We validate our methods
by presenting experimental results in a case study, the Trading Agent Competition for Supply
Chain Management.
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1. Introduction
Business organizations seeking advantage are increasingly looking to automated decision sup-
port systems. These systems have become increasingly sophisticated in recent years. Advanced
decision support systems are evolving into software agents that can act rationally on behalf of
their users in a variety of application areas. Examples include procurement [27,7], scheduling
and resource management [12,5], and personal information management [2,21].
In this paper, we show how machine learning techniques can be used to support rational
decision making in a sales environment. We are particularly interested in environments that
are constrained by capacity and materials availability. We demonstrate our approach in the
context of an autonomous agent that is designed to compete in the Trading Agent Competition
for Supply Chain Management (TAC SCM) [4].
Our method characterizes market conditions by distinguishable statistical patterns. We call
these patterns economic regimes. We show how such patterns can be learned from historical
data and identiﬁed from observable data. We outline how to identify regimes and forecast regime
transitions. This prediction, in turn, can be used to allocate resources to current and future
sales in a way that maximizes resource value. While this type of prediction about the economic
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environment is commonly used at the macro economic level [24], such predictions are rarely done
for a micro economic environment.
In addition to the supply-chain trading example, there are a number of other domains that
could beneﬁt from our approach. Examples include agents for automated trading in ﬁnancial
markets, such as the Penn-Lehman Automated Trading Project [13], auction-based contracting
environments, such as MAGNET [6], and other auctions, such as auctions for IBM PCs [20] or
PDA’s on eBay [9].
After a review of relevant literature, we describe in a general way the information needed
to make strategic and tactical sales decisions. We follow with a discussion of the concept of
“economic regimes” and their representation using learned probability density functions. We
then describe how this method is used in an automated trading agent. For reader’s convenience,
we present a summary of our notation in the Appendix.
2. Literature review
Predicting prices is an important part of the decision process of agents or human decision
makers. Kephart et al. [14] explored several dynamic pricing algorithms for information goods,
where shopbots look for the best price, and pricebots adapt their prices to attract business.
Wellman [32] analyzed and developed metrics for price prediction algorithms in the TAC Classic
game, similar to what we have done for TAC SCM.
Massey and Wu [22] show in their analysis that the ability of decision makers to correctly
identify the onset of a new regime can mean the diﬀerence between success and failure. Further-
more they found strong evidence that individuals pay inordinate attention to the signal (price
in our case), and neglect diagnosticity (regime probabilities) and transition probability (Markov
matrix), the aspects of the system that generates the signal. Individuals who do not pay enough
attention to regime identiﬁcation and prediction have the tendency to over- or underreact to
market conditions.
Ghose et al. [10] the authors empirically analyze the degree to which used products cannibalize
new product sales for books on Amazon.com. In their study they show that product prices
go through diﬀerent regimes over time. Marketing research methods have been developed to
understand the conditions for growth in performance and the role that marketing actions can
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play to improve sales. For instance, in [26], an analysis is presented on how in mature economic
markets strategic windows of change alternate with long periods of stability.
Much work has focused on models for rational decision-making in autonomous agents. Ng
and Russel [23] show that an agent’s decisions can be viewed as a set of linear constraints on the
space of possible utility (reward) functions. However, the simple reward structure they used in
their experiments will not scale to what is needed to predict prices in more complex situations
such as TAC SCM.
Chajewska, Koller, and Ormoneit [3] describe a method for predicting the future decisions
of an agent based on its past decisions. They learn the agent’s utility function by observing
its behavior. Their approach is based on the assumption that the agent is a rational decision
maker. According to decision theory, rational decision making amounts to maximization of the
expected utility [31]. In TAC SCM, we cannot apply these techniques because the behaviors of
individual agents are not directly observable.
Sales strategies used in previous TAC SCM competitions have attempted to model the prob-
ability of receiving an order for a given oﬀer price, either by estimating the probability by
linear interpolation from the minimum and maximum daily prices [25], or by estimating the
relationship between oﬀer price and order probability with a linear cumulative density function
(CDF) [1], or by using a reverse CDF and factors such as quantity and due date [15]. The
Jackaroo team [33] applied a game theoretic approach to set oﬀer prices, using a variation of the
Cournot game for modeling the product market. The SouthamptonSCM [11] team used fuzzy
reasoning to set oﬀer prices. Similar techniques have been used outside TAC SCM to predict
oﬀer prices in ﬁrst price sealed bid reverse auctions for IBM PCs [20] or PDA’s on eBay [9].
In [17] the authors demonstrate a method for predicting future customer demand in the TAC
SCM game environment, and use the predicted future demand to inform agent behavior. Their
approach is speciﬁc to the TAC SCM situation, since it depends on knowing the formula by
which customer demand is computed. Note that customer demand is only one of the factors for
characterizing the multi-dimensional regime parameter space.
All these methods fail to take into account market conditions that are not directly observable.
They are essentially regression models, and do not represent qualitative diﬀerences in market
conditions. Our method, in contrast, is able to detect and forecast a broader range of market
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conditions. Regression based approaches (including non-parametric variations) assume that the
functional form of the relationship between dependent and independent variables has the same
structure. An approach like ours that models variability and does not assume a functional
relationship provides more ﬂexibility and detects changes in relationship between prices and
sales over time.
An analysis [16] of the TAC SCM 2004 competition shows that supply and demand (expressed
as regimes in our method) are key factors in determining market prices, and that agents which
were able to detect and exploit these conditions had an advantage.
3. Tactical and strategic decisions
We are primarily interested in competitive market environments that are constrained by re-
sources and/or production capacity. In such an environment, a manager who wants to maximize
the value of available resources should be concerned about both strategic and tactical decisions.
The basic strategic decision is to allocate available resources (ﬁnancial, capacity, inventory, etc.)
over some time horizon in a way that is expected to return the maximum yield in the market.
For example, in a market that has a strong seasonal variation, one might want to build up an
inventory of ﬁnished goods during the oﬀ season, when demand is low and prices are weak, in
order to prepare for an expected period of strong demand and good prices. For the purpose of
this paper, tactical decisions are concerned with setting prices to maximize proﬁts, within the
parameters set by the strategic decisions. So, for instance, if the forecast sales volume for the
current week is 100,000 units, we would want to ﬁnd the highest sales price that would move
that volume.
We believe that our technique of modeling the economic regimes in a market can be used
to inform both the strategic and tactical decision processes. In Figure 1 we show a schematic
way how to present this process. In our formulation, a regime is essentially a distribution of
prices over sales volume. We use this regime deﬁnition to characterize the market. By modeling
an approximation of the probability of sale given an asking price and combining with demand
numbers, this leads directly to (nearly) optimal pricing decisions.
In order to use our technique to inform the strategic decision process, we need to be able to
forecast regime shifts in the market. If our forecast shows an upcoming period of low demand
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Figure 1. Process chart – Regime identiﬁcation is a tool for tactical decision making and regime
prediction is a tool for strategic decision making.
and weak prices, we may want to sell more aggressively in the short term, and we may want
to limit procurement and production to prevent driving an oversupply into the market. On the
other hand, if our forecast shows an upcoming period of high demand and strong prices, we
may want to increase procurement and production, and raise short-term prices, in order to be
well-positioned for the future.
4. Economic regimes
Market conditions change over time, and this should aﬀect the strategy used by an agent
in procurement, production planning, and product pricing. Economic theory suggests that
economic environments exhibit 3 dominant market patterns: scarcity, balanced, and oversupply.
We deﬁne a scarcity condition if there is more customer demand than product supply in the
market, a balanced condition if demand is approximately equal to supply, and an oversupply
condition if there is less customer demand than product supply in the market. When there is
scarcity, prices are higher, so the agent should price more aggressively. In balanced situations,
prices are lower and have more spread, so the agent has a range of options for maximizing
expected proﬁt. In oversupply situations prices are lower. The agent should primarily control
costs, and therefore either do pricing based on costs, or wait for better market conditions.
Figure 2 shows typical curves for the probability of receiving an order for a given oﬀer price.
The slope of the curve and its position changes over time. According to economic theory, high
prices and a steep slope correspond to a situation of scarcity, where price elasticity is small,
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while a less steep slope corresponds to a balanced market where the range of prices is larger.
We believe that even though the market is constantly changing, there are some underlying
dominant patterns which characterize the aforementioned market conditions. We deﬁne a speciﬁc
mode a market can be in as a regime. A way of solving the decision problem an agent is faced
with is to characterize those regimes and to apply speciﬁc decision making methods to each
regime. This requires an agent to have methods for ﬁguring out what is the current regime and
for predicting which future regimes will be in its planning horizon.
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Figure 2. The reverse cumulative density function represents probability of order. Typical order
probability curves during scarcity (left top), balanced (left middle) and oversupply (left bottom)
regimes and experimental order probability curves (right).
The curves shown on the right are from TAC SCM data and are measured at diﬀerent days from
the start of the game.
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4.1. Analysis of historical data to characterize market regimes
The ﬁrst phase in our approach is to identify and characterize market regimes by analyzing
data from past sales. The assumption we make is that enough historical data are available for
the analysis and that historical data are suﬃciently representative of possible market conditions.
Information observable in real-time in the market is then used to identify the current regime
and to forecast regime transitions.
Since product prices are likely to have diﬀerent ranges for diﬀerent products, we normalize
them. We call np the normalized price and deﬁne it as follows:
np =
ProductPrice
NominalProductCost
(1)
=
ProductPrice
AssemblyCost +
∑numParts
j=1 NominalPartCostj
(2)
where NominalPartCostj is the nominal cost of the j-th part, numParts is the number of parts
needed to make the product, and AssemblyCost is the cost of manufacturing the product. An
advantage of using normalized prices is that we can easily compare price patterns across diﬀerent
products.
Historical data are used to estimate the price density, p(np), and to characterize regimes. We
start by estimating the price density function by ﬁtting a Gaussian mixture model (GMM) [30]
to historical normalized price, np, data. We use a GMM since it is able to approximate arbitrary
density functions. Another advantage is that the GMM is a semi-parametric approach which
allows for fast computing and uses less memory than other approaches.
In this paper, we present results using a GMM with ﬁxed means, µi, and ﬁxed variances,
σi, since we want one set of Gaussians to work for all games oﬀ-line and online. We use the
Expectation-Maximization (EM) Algorithm [8] to determine the prior probability, P (ci), of the
Gaussians components of the GMM. The means, µi, are uniformly distributed and the variances,
σ2i , tile the space. Speciﬁcally variances were chosen so that adjacent Gaussians are two standard
deviations apart.
The density of the normalized price can be written as:
p(np) =
N∑
i=1
p(np|ci)P (ci) (3)
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where p(np|ci) is the i-th Gaussian from the GMM, i.e.,
p(np|ci) = p(np|µi, σi) = 1
σi
√
2π
e
[−(np−µi)2
2×σ2
i
]
(4)
where µi is the mean and σi is the standard deviation of the i-th Gaussian from the GMM. An
example of a GMM is shown in Figure 3. While the choice of N , the number of Gaussians’, in
a GMM is arbitrary, the choice should reﬂect a balance between accuracy and computational
overhead. By accuracy we mean predicted accuracy, which is not the same as ﬁt accuracy.
Creating a model with a very good ﬁt to the observed data does not usually translate well into
predictions. If the model has too many degrees of freedom the likelihood of overﬁtting the data
is great. We chose N = 16 and N = 25 to show the eﬀect of model ﬂexibility on results for
several prediction measures and illustrate their tradeoﬀs.
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Figure 3. The price density density function, p(np), (right y-axis) estimated by the Gaussian
mixture model with 16 components ﬁts well the historical normalized price data (left y-axis
represents product quantity) for a sample market. Data are from 18 games from semi-ﬁnals and
ﬁnals of TAC SCM 2005.
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Using Bayes’ rule we determine the posterior probability:
P (ci|np) = p(np|ci)P (ci)∑N
i=1 p(np|ci)P (ci)
∀i = 1, · · · , N (5)
We then deﬁne the posterior probabilities of all Gaussians’ given a normalized price, np, as the
following N-dimensional vector:
η(np) = [P (c1|np), P (c2|np), . . . , P (cN |np)]. (6)
For each normalized price npj we compute the vector of the posterior normalized price proba-
bilities, η(npj), which is η evaluated at each observed normalized price npj.
The intuitive idea of a regime as recurrent economic condition is captured by discovering price
distributions that recur across days. We deﬁne regimes by clustering price distributions across
days using the k-means algorithm with a similarity measure on both probability vectors η(npj)
and normalized prices np. The clusters found by this method correspond to frequently occurring
price distributions with support on contiguous range of np.1
The center of each cluster (ignoring the last component which contains the rescaled price
information) is a probability vector that corresponds to regime r = Rk for k = 1, · · · ,M ,
where M is the number of regimes. Collecting these vectors into a matrix yields the conditional
probability matrix P(c|r). The matrix has N rows, one for each component of the GMM, and
M columns, one for each regime.
In Figure 4 we distinguish ﬁve regimes, which we can call extreme oversupply (R1), oversupply
(R2), balanced (R3), scarcity (R4), and extreme scarcity (R5). We decided to use ﬁve regimes
instead of the three basic regimes which are suggested by economic theory because in this way we
are able to isolate outlier regimes, such as extreme oversupply and extreme scarcity, in a market.
Regimes R1 and R2 represent a situation where there is a glut in the market, i.e. an oversupply
situation, which depresses prices. Regimes R3 represents a balanced market situation, where
1We have found that sometimes data points corresponding to speciﬁc regimes are close in probability space, but
not in price space. Speciﬁcally it can happen that one regime dominates the extreme low and the extreme high
price range, with diﬀerent regimes in between. This regime is more diﬃcult to interpret in terms of market
concepts like oversupply or scarcity. To circumvent this problem we perform clustering in an augmented space
formed by appending a rescaled version of np to the probability vector. Speciﬁcally, the mean of np is subtracted
and np is scaled so that its standard deviation matches the largest standard deviation of the probability vectors.
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Figure 4. An example of learned regime probabilities , P (Rk|np), over normalized price np, for
a sample market in TAC SCM after training.
most of the demand is satisﬁed. In regime R3 the agent has a range of options of price vs sales
volume. Regimes R4 and R5 represent a situation where there is scarcity of products in the
market, which increases prices. In this case the agent should price as close as possible to the
estimated maximum price a customer is willing to pay.
For the TAC SCM domain, the number of regimes was selected a priori, after examining the
data and looking at economic analyses of market situations. In our experiments we found out
that the number of regimes chosen does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the results regarding price trend
predictions. The computation of the GMM and k-means clustering were tried with diﬀerent
initial conditions, but consistently converged to the same results.
We marginalize the product of the density of the normalized price, np, given the i-th Gaussian
of the GMM, p(np|ci), and the conditional probability clustering matrix, P (ci|Rk), over all
Gaussians ci. We obtain the density of the normalized price np dependent on the regime Rk:
p(np|Rk) =
N∑
i=1
p(np|ci)P (ci|Rk). (7)
The probability of regime Rk dependent on the normalized price np can be computed using
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Bayes rule as:
P (Rk|np) = p(np|Rk)P (Rk)∑M
k=1 p(np|Rk)P (Rk)
∀k = 1, · · · ,M. (8)
where M is the number of regimes. The prior probabilities, P (Rk), of the diﬀerent regimes are
determined by a counting process over past data. Figure 4 depicts the regime probabilities for a
sample market in TAC SCM. Each regime is clearly dominant over a range of normalized prices.
The intuition behind regimes is that prices communicate information about future expecta-
tions of the market. However, absolute prices do not mean much because the same price point
can be achieved in a static mode (i.e., when prices don’t change), when prices are increasing, or
when prices are decreasing. In the construction of a regime the variation in prices (the nature,
variance, and the neighborhood) are considered thereby providing a better assessment of market
conditions.
We model regime prediction as a Markov process. The last step is the computation of the
Markov transition matrix to be used by the agent for regime prediction. We construct the
Markov transition matrix, Tpredict(rt+1|rt) by a counting process over past data. This matrix
represents the posterior probability of transitioning at time step t + 1 to regime rt+1 given the
current regime rt at time step t.
4.2. Identification of current regime
Previous sales data are used to learn the characterization of diﬀerent market regimes. In
real-time an agent can then use this regime information to identify the dominant regime. This
can be done by calculating (or estimating) the normalized prices for the current time step, t.
Since complete current price information might not be available, we indicate the estimated
normalized price at time t by npt. Depending on the application domain, the price estimate can
be accurate, or can be an approximation.
The agent selects the regime which has the highest probability, i.e.
argmax
1≤k≤M
P (Rk|npt).
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4.3. Regime prediction
The prediction of regime probabilities is based on two distinct operations:
1. a correction (recursive Bayesian update) of the posterior probabilities for the regimes based
on the history of measurements of the estimated median normalized prices obtained since
the time of the last regime change until the current time step.
2. prediction of the posterior distribution of regimes n time steps into the future, done re-
cursively.
If the data for the current time-step is unavailable then we need to include after the correction
operation a one time-step prediction to the current time before we do a prediction of future
regime. The agent can use this forecast of regime transitions to drive its strategic decision
process.
5. A case study: TAC SCM
The Trading Agent Competition for Supply Chain Management [4] (TAC SCM) is a market
simulation in which six autonomous agents compete to maximize proﬁts in a computer-assembly
scenario. The simulation takes place over 220 virtual days, each lasting ﬁfteen seconds of real
time. Agents earn money by selling computers they assemble out of parts they purchase from
suppliers. Each agent has a limited-capacity assembly facility, and must pay for warehousing
its inventory. In addition, each agent has a bank account with an initial balance of zero. The
agent with the highest bank balance at the end of the game wins.
To obtain parts, an agent must send a request for quotes (RFQ) to an appropriate supplier.
Each RFQ speciﬁes a component type, a quantity, and a due date. The next day, the agent will
receive a response to each request. Suppliers respond by evaluating each RFQ to determine how
many components they can deliver on the requested due date, considering the outstanding orders
they have committed to and at what price. If the supplier can produce the desired quantity
on time, it responds with an oﬀer that contains the price of the supplies. If not, the supplier
responds with two oﬀers: (1) an earliest complete oﬀer with a revised due date and a price.
This revised due date is the ﬁrst day in which the supplier believes it will be able to provide
the entire quantity requested; and (2) a partial oﬀer with a revised quantity and a price with
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Figure 5. Schematic overview of a typical TAC SCM game scenario.
the requested due date. The agent can accept either of these alternative oﬀers, or reject both.
Suppliers may deliver late, due to uncertainty in their production capacities. Suppliers discount
part prices according to the ratio of supply to demand.
Every day each agent receives a set of RFQs from potential customers. Each customer RFQ
speciﬁes the type of computers requested, along with quantity, due date, reserve price, and
penalty for late delivery. Each agent may choose to bid on some or all of the day’s RFQs.
Customers accept the lowest bid that is at or below the reserve price, and notify the winning
agent. The agent must ship customer orders on time, or pay the penalty for each day an order
is late. If a product is not shipped within ﬁve days of the due date the order is canceled, the
agent receives no payment, and no further penalties accrue.
An agent can produce 16 diﬀerent types of computers, that are categorized into three diﬀerent
market segments (low, medium, and high). Demand in each market segment varies randomly
during the game. Other variables, such as storage costs and interest rates also vary between
games.
The other agents playing in the same game aﬀect signiﬁcantly the market, since they all
compete for the same parts and customers. This complicates the operational and strategic
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decisions an agent has to make every day during the game, which include how many parts to
buy, when to get the parts delivered, how to schedule its factory production, what types of
computers to build, when to sell them, and at what price.
5.1. Experimental setup
For our experiments, we used data from a set of 24 games (18 for training2 and 6 for testing3)
played during the semi-ﬁnals and ﬁnals of TAC SCM 2005. The mix of players changed from
game to game, the total number of players was 12 in the semi-ﬁnals and 6 in the ﬁnals.
Since supply and demand in TAC SCM change in each of the market segments (low, medium,
and high) independently of the other segments, our method is applied to each individual market
segment.
Each type of computer has a nominal cost, which is the sum of the nominal cost of each
of the parts needed to build it. In TAC SCM the cost of the facility is sunk, and there is no
per-unit assembly cost. We normalize the prices across the diﬀerent computer types in each
market segment.
5.2. Online identification of current regime
Every day the agent receives a report which includes the minimum and maximum prices of the
computers sold the day before, but not the quantities sold. The mid-range price, np, the price
between the minimum and maximum, can be used to approximate the mean price, however, it
does not always provide an accurate estimate of the mean price because of the local ﬂuctuation in
minimum and maximum prices. In other words, since the minimum and maximum prices could
be unusual and temporary ﬂuctuation, they may be outliers and not within the true distribution
of the prevailing prices.
An example which shows how the mid-range value diﬀers from the mean value is in Figure 6.
The mean value is computed after the game, when the entire game data are available. We
observe that the mid-range price is diﬀerent from the mean price. In this example, around day
110, 120, 140 and at the end, we observe a high spike in the maximum price. This was caused
by an opportunistic agent who discovered a small amount of unsatisﬁed demand, but most of
23694@tac3, 3700@tac3, 4229@tac4, 4234@tac4, 7815@tac5, 7821@tac5, 5638@tac6, 5639@tac6, 3719@tac3,
3720@tac3, 3721@tac3, 3722@tac3, 3723@tac3, 4255@tac4,4256@tac4, 4257@tac4, 4258@tac4, 4259@tac4 – To
obtain the complete path name append .sics.se to each game number.
33717@tac3, 3718@tac3, 3724@tac3, 4253@tac4, 4254@tac4, 4260@tac4
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that day’s orders were sold at a much lower price.
To lower the impact of sudden price changes we implemented a Brown linear (i.e. double)
exponential smoother with α = 0.5. The general form of this smoother is:
S′t−1 = α · npt−1 + (1− α) · S′t−2 (9)
S′′t−1 = α · S′t−1 + (1− α) · S′′t−2 (10)
n˜pt−1 = 2 · S′t−1 − S′′t−1 (11)
Since we only have the minimum and maximum prices from the previous day available and not
the real mean, we decided to model n˜pt−1 as follows:
n˜pt−1 =
n˜pmint−1 + n˜pmaxt−1
2
(12)
This results in a better approximation of the real mean price than smoothing only the mid-range
price from the previous day. Figure 6 shows that the smoothed mid-range price, n˜p, is closer to
the mean price.
During the game, the agent estimates on day t the current regime by calculating the smoothed
mid-range normalized price n˜pt−1 for the previous day (recall that the agent every day receives
the prices for the previous day) and by selecting the regime which has the highest probability,
i.e. argmax1≤k≤M P (Rk|n˜pt−1).
The mid-range price can be used to identify the corresponding regime online, as shown in
Figure 7 (left). The data are from game 3721@tac3, which was not in the training set of games
used to develop the regime deﬁnitions. The middle and right parts of Figure 7 show respectively
the probability of receiving an order in a balanced and in a scarcity situation for diﬀerent prices.
Scarcity typically occurs early in the game and at other times when supply is low. These
probabilities are computed from past game data for each regime.
Figure 8 shows the relative probabilities of each regime over the course of a game. The graph
shows that diﬀerent regimes are dominant at diﬀerent points in the game, and that there are
brief intervals during which two regimes are almost equally likely. An agent could use this
information to decide which strategy, or mixture of strategies, to follow.
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Figure 6. Minimum, maximum, mean, mid-range, and smoothed mid-range daily normalized
prices of computers sold, as reported during the game every day for the medium market segment
in the 3721@tac3, one of the ﬁnal games. The mean price is computed after the game using the
game data, which include complete information on all the transactions.
A measure of the conﬁdence in the regime identiﬁcation is the entropy of the set S of proba-
bilities of the regimes given the normalized mid-range price from the daily price reports n˜pday,
where
S = {P (R1|n˜pday), · · · , P (RM |n˜pday)} (13)
and
Entropy(S) ≡
M∑
k=1
−P (Rk|n˜pday) log2 P (Rk|n˜pday) (14)
An entropy value close to zero corresponds to a high conﬁdence in the current regime and
an entropy value close to its maximum, i.e. for M regimes log2 M , indicates that the current
market situation is a mixture of M almost equally likely regimes. An example for the medium
market segment in game 3721@tac3 is shown in Figure 9.
Figure 10 (left) shows the factory utilization (FU) in percent, the ratio of oﬀer to demand,
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Figure 7. Game 3721@tac3 (Final TAC SCM 2005) – Regimes over time for the medium market
computed online every day (left), probability of receiving an order by normalized price for an
extreme scarcity situation (R5 indicated by ES) (second from the left), for a balanced situa-
tion (R3 indicated by B) (second from the right) and for an extreme oversupply situation (R1
indicated by EO) (right).
which represents the proportion of the market demand that is satisﬁed, and the normalized price
(np) over time. On the right side we display the quantity of the unsold ﬁnished goods inventory
(FG) instead of factory utilization4. The regimes identiﬁed by our approach are superimposed,
4The quantity of the ﬁnished goods inventory is aﬀected by other factors, such as storage cost, which have
changed in the TAC SCM 2005 games. In 2005 and 2006 games agents tend to build to order and keep most of
their inventory in the form of parts, not ﬁnished products.
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Figure 8. Regime probabilities over time computed online every day for the medium market
segment in game 3721@tac3 (Final TAC SCM 2005).
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Figure 9. Daily entropy values of the ﬁve regimes for the medium market segment in game
3721@tac3. Notice how the entropy values match the regime probabilities shown in Figure 8.
where ES (or R5) represents extreme scarcity, S (or R4) scarcity, B (or R3) balanced, O (or R2)
oversupply, and EO (or R1) extreme oversupply. These factors clearly correlate with market
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Figure 10. Game 3721@tac3 (Final TAC SCM 2005) – Relationships between regimes and
normalized prices in the medium market. On the left axis, we show in the left ﬁgure the daily
factory utilization and in the right ﬁgure the available ﬁnished goods inventory of all agents. In
both ﬁgures we display on the left axis as well the ratio of oﬀer to demand (which ranges from
0 to 5.38), which is scaled to ﬁt between the minimum and maximum values of the left axis.
On the right axis we show the normalized prices. The dominant regimes are labeled along the
bottom.
regimes, but they are not directly visible to the agent during the game. For example, the ﬁgure
shows that when the oﬀer to demand ratio is high (i.e. oversupply) prices are low and vice versa.
We can observe that the ratio of oﬀer to demand changes signiﬁcantly during the game. For
instance, on day 111 the ratio of oﬀer to demand is 1.95 and prices are high. On day 208 the
ratio of oﬀer to demand is much higher, 5.38, and prices are lower. We can also observe that
prices tend to lag changes in ratio of oﬀer to demand.
5.3. Predicting regime transitions
For TAC SCM, we model the prediction of future regimes as a Markov process. We construct
a Markov transition matrix, Tpredict(rt+1|rt) oﬀ-line by a counting process over past games. This
matrix represents the posterior probability of transitioning in day t+1 to regime rt+1 given the
current regime in day t, rt.
The prediction of regime probabilities is based on two distinct operations:
1. a correction (recursive Bayesian update) of the posterior probabilities for the regimes
based on the history of measurements of the smoothed mid-range normalized price n˜p
obtained since the time of the last regime change, t0, until the previous day, t − 1. We
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use P (rt−1|{n˜pt0 , . . . , n˜pt−1}), to indicate a vector of the posterior probabilities of all the
regimes on day t− 1.
2. a prediction of regime posterior probabilities for the current day, t. The prediction of the
posterior distribution of regimes n days into the future, P (rt+n|{n˜pt0 , . . . , n˜pt−1}), is done
recursively as follows:
P (rt+n|{n˜pt0 , . . . , n˜pt−1})
=
∑
rt+n
· · ·
∑
rt−1
{
P (rt−1|{n˜pt0 , . . . , n˜pt−1}) ·
n∏
j=0
Tpredict(rt+j |rt+j−1)
}
(15)
Examples of regime predictions for game 3721@tac3 for the mediummarket segment are shown
in Figure 11 and Figure 12. The ﬁgures show the real regimes measured after the game from
the game data and the predictions made by our method during the game. As it can be seen in
the ﬁgures, the match between predictions and real data is very good.
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Figure 11. Regime predictions for game
3721@tac3 starting on day 80 for 20 days into
the future for the medium market segment.
Data are shown as computed after the game
using the complete set of data, and as pre-
dicted by our method during the game.
110 115 120 125 130 135 140
EO
O
B
S
ES
O
ff−
lin
e
110 115 120 125 130 135 140
EO
O
B
S
ES
Time in Days
Pr
ed
ict
io
n
Figure 12. Regime predictions for game
3721@tac3 starting on day 110 for 30 days into
the future for the medium market segment.
Figure 11 shows a predicted change from from an oversupply situation to a balanced situation.
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This means that the agent should sell less today and build up more inventory for future days
when prices will be higher. On the other hand we see in Figure 12 a predicted change from the
scarcity to the balanced regime. In this case the agent should try to sell more aggressively the
current day, since prices will be decreasing in the next days.
6. Performance of regime identification and prediction
Our method is useful to the extent that it characterizes and predicts real qualities of the mar-
ket. There are many hidden variables in a competitive market, such as the inventory positions
and procurement arrangements of the competitors. Our method uses observable historical and
current data to guide tactical and strategic decision processes. In this section we evaluate the
practical value of regime identiﬁcation and prediction.
6.1. Relationship between identified regime and market variables
We expect identiﬁed regimes to qualitatively represent the status of the important hidden
market factors. A correlation analysis of market parameters of the training set is shown in
Figure 13. The p-values for the correlation analysis are all less than 0.01. Regime EO (extreme
oversupply) correlates positively with quantity of ﬁnished goods inventory, negatively with per-
cent of factory utilization, positively with the ratio of oﬀer to demand, and negatively with
normalized price. On the other hand, in Regime ES (extreme scarcity) we observe a negative
correlation with the amount of unsold ﬁnished goods inventory, with the percent of factory
utilization, and the ratio of oﬀer to demand, and positively with normalized price.
An advantage of using 5 regimes instead of 3 regimes is that we gain two degrees of freedom
for better decision making, by isolating the outliers in the market. For example, regime EO
(extreme oversupply) is diﬀerent from Regime O (oversupply) since it presents a potential price
war situation. Another diﬀerence between regime EO and regime O is that regime EO is
universally unproﬁtable and that regime O is marginally proﬁtable for most agents. Regimes
B and S are universally proﬁtable and in regime ES some agents have left the market. The
major diﬀerence between the scarcity regime, S, and the extreme scarcity regime, ES, is that
in regime S the factory runs at full capacity, caused by excess demand, and in regime ES we
observe a scarcity of parts, with the result that production capacity is underutilized.
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Figure 13. Training set (18 games) – Correlation coeﬃcients between regimes and quantity of
ﬁnished goods inventory, factory utilization, the ratio of oﬀer to demand, and normalized price
(np) in the medium market segment. All values are signiﬁcant at the p = 0.01 level.
Another way to evaluate the quality of regime identiﬁcation is given by an interpretation of
the k-means clustering algorithm. Essentially, it ﬁnds points along the path that connects the
regime centers in the regime probability space. In Figure 14 we represent the results of the k-
means clustering algorithm, or the learned regime probabilities. For ease of visualization we use
only 3 regimes to explain the learned behavior; the 5 regime case produces similar results, but
they are harder to visualize. We can see that the learned regime probabilities in the posterior
probability space connect the regimes in the “expected” way. In other words, we do not see
points directly between scarcity and oversupply; instead, the path leads from scarcity through
balance to oversupply.
Since the behavior of an agent should depend not just on the current regime but also on
expected future regimes, the agent needs to predict future regimes. We would expect a dynamic
regime prediction algorithm to move along this path of learned regime probabilities.
6.2. Prediction of discrete regime change
We measure the accuracy of regime prediction using a count of how many times the regime
predicted is the correct one. As ground truth we measure regime switches and their time oﬀ-
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Figure 14. An example of learned regime probabilities, P (Rk|np), for the medium market
segment in TAC SCM after training.
line using data from the game. Starting with day 1 until day 199, we forecast every day the
regimes for the next 20 days and we forecast when a regime transition would occur. The reason
for limiting the prediction to 20 days is that every 20 days the agent receives a report which
includes the mean price of each of the computer types sold since the last market report, and so
it can correct, if needed, its current regime identiﬁcation. Experimental results for a GMM with
16 and 25 components are shown in Figure 15.
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Figure 15. Success rate of correct regime shift prediction. The left ﬁgure is generated using a
GMM with 16 components and the right ﬁgure with 25 components.
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Table 1 reports the average number of regime changes and standard deviation for each market
segment of the testing set. We see that the method produces robust results when varying the
number of Gaussians in the GMM.
low market medium market high market # Gaussians
avg/stdev avg/stdev avg/stdev
# regime changes 11.20/3.16 14.3/3.47 13.4/3.58 16
11.25/3.56 13.5/5.2 12.75/3.44 25
Table 1
Average number of regime changes and standard deviation of the testing set.
6.3. Prediction of regime distribution
The above results are based on discrete regimes, i.e., using only the dominant regime of
each predicted day to the actual value of any given day. One measure which can be used in
determining the closeness of all individual predicted regime probabilities to the actual ones
is called the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence [19,18]. This is a quantity which measures
the diﬀerence between two probability distributions in bits, meaning the smaller the measure
the closer the predictions are to optimal. We can calculate the Kullback-Leibler divergence,
KL(P (R)pred‖P (R)actual) as:
KL(P (R)pred‖P (R)actual) =
∑
r∈R
P (R)pred log
(
P (R)pred
P (R)actual
)
(16)
The KL diﬀerence can be interpreted in terms of how much additional data is needed to achieve
optimal prediction performance. The precision of this data is given by the number of bits in the
KL-divergence measure. For example a 1 bit diﬀerence would require an additional binary piece
of information [28], like: “Were yesterday’s bids all satisﬁed?” If the diﬀerence between the two
distributions is 0 than the predictions are optimal in sense that all the probabilistic information
about pricing behavior is accurate (e.g. the predicted and actual distributions match).
In Figure 16 we show prediction results in terms of KL-divergence for a GMM with 16 com-
ponents (left) and for a GMM with 25 components (right). Our predictions diﬀer between 0.3
bits and 1 bits of information, as opposed to the Exponential Smoother predictions which vary
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Figure 16. Normalized KL-divergence between the Markov predicted regime distribution and
the actual distribution (circle), and the double exponentially smoothed predicted distribution
and the actual distribution (diamond) over the planning horizon. KL-divergences computed
using 5 regimes for the medium market segment over the testing set. The left ﬁgure is generated
using a GMM with 16 components and the right ﬁgure with 25 components.
between 0.3 and 3.5 bits for a GMM with 16 components and between 0.2 and 6.5 (not shown
to maintain the same scale for the KL-divergence with the right ﬁgure) bits for a GMM with
25 components. The 20 days, Exponential Smoother predictions are approximately 5.6 and
45 times as bad as Markov predictions. It is typically acceptable having a KL-divergence less
than or close to one. There will not be signiﬁcant gains by obtaining more information in the
estimation procedure.
We observe that a the GMM with 25 components ﬁts the actual regime probabilities much
better for the ﬁrst three days (tactical decision making) and the GMM with 16 components ﬁts
the actual regime probabilities much better in the long term (strategic decision making). The
best estimate for the current day is given by the exponential smoother and as a result should
be used as an input to generate the price density (explained in Section 7) and sales oﬀer prices
for the current day.
The KL-divergence tells us that the predicted regime distribution in the long term is closer
to the real distribution with a GMM with 16 components than the one with 25 components.
On the other hand we observe in Figure 15 the opposite is true. Here actually the GMM with
25 components has a higher regime change prediction accuracy. The reason is that we need to
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optimize the number of GMM components for the right measure. The regime change success
rate is based on a discrete regime identiﬁcation, but the KL-divergence measures the closeness
of the whole distribution. To match closely the whole distribution is much more important
for automated applications, e.g. dynamic pricing algorithms, that utilizes the continuous dis-
tribution. A human decision maker on the other side might get a fast and deep insight from
prediction of discrete future regimes, since they translate possible directly into some actions on
the procurement or sales side.
6.4. Prediction error
We also measured the prediction error for the price distributions generated by our model.
Because the mixture of Gaussians can only approximate the true price distributions, we measured
the diﬀerence between observed price frequencies and model predictions using a Monte Carlo
method. In particular, price frequencies were computed for 64 bins from game data to form an
empirical histogram. Simulated price data was sampled from the mixture model and binned as
per real data. Prediction error was deﬁned as the 1-norm (sum of absolute diﬀerences) distance
between simulated and measured histograms, averaged across 1000 simulated data samples. In
Figure 17 we explain the algorithm used to analyze price predictions when sampling from the
learned GMM with 16 and 25 components and table 2 displays the results for the ﬁtted GMMs.
1 Inputs:
2 pnpavg: original normalized price density
3 numBins: the number of histogram bins
4 GMM : learned Gaussian Mixture Model
5 maxIter: number of iterations
6 Output:
7 PredErr: the overall mean prediction error
8 Process:
9 for j until maxIter
10 pnpsamp = Monte Carlo Sampling(GMM )
11 Error(j) = |pnpavg−pnpsamp|numBins
12 end loop
13 meanErr = Error
14 PredErr = numBins ·∑meanErr
15 return PredErr
Figure 17. Prediction error algorithm.
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low market medium market high market # Gaussians
Prediction Error in % 6.69 6.89 8.99 16
Prediction Error in % 5.75 5.48 5.95 25
Table 2
Overall prediction error for a 16 and a 25 GMM in the three market segments. Results were
obtained after averaging over 1000 iterations.
The results show that the total error introduced by the mixture model approximation varied
between 5% − 8%, with more components resulting in slightly lower errors.
7. Prediction of price density and price trend
In our approach, an agent predicts the price distribution, see Equation 17, using the predicted
regime distribution and the learned GMM for every day over the planning horizon n with a range
of values for np.
p(Price at t + n | Price History since Regime Change)
= f(Predicted Regime Probabilities , Estimated Price Density) (17)
Figure 18 shows the forecast price density for game 3721@tac3, for 30 days starting at day 110.
The dashed curve represents the price density for the ﬁrst forecasted day, the thick solid line
shows the price density for the last forecasted day, and the thin solid curves show the forecast for
the intermediate days. As expected the predicted price density broadens as we forecast further
into the future, reﬂecting a decreasing certainty in the prediction.
We can also compare the actual price trends with our predictions. Figure 19 shows the real
mean price trend along with forecast price trends based on the diﬀerent predictors, e.g. the 5%,
10% and the 50% percentiles. All the curves in the ﬁgure represent a relative price trend – to
better compare the diﬀerent predictors which each other graphically, we subtracted from each
forecasted value the ﬁrst predicted value, so that they all start at zero.
Detecting and Forecasting Economic Regimes in Automated Exchanges 29
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
Normalized Price (np)
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
De
ns
ity
 o
f n
p
Day one forecast distribution
Figure 18. Predicted price density using the
Markov model for game 3721@tac3 from day
110 until day 140 in the medium market seg-
ment. The red dashed curve is the price den-
sity estimate for the current day, the black
solid curve is the price density estimate for
the last day in the planning horizon, and the
green solid curves are the estimates for the
intermediate days.
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Figure 19. Predicted price trend for game
3721@tac3 from day 110 until day 140 in the
medium market segment. The solid curve is
the real mean price and the dashed and dotted
curves are predicted price trends based on the
5%, 10% and 50% percentile on the predicted
price density.
8. Conclusions and future work
We have presented an approach for identifying and predicting market conditions in markets
for durable goods. We have demonstrated the eﬀectiveness of our approach using games played
in the semi-ﬁnals and ﬁnals from TAC SCM 2005. An advantage of the proposed method is
that it works in any market for durable goods, since the computational process is completely
data driven and that no classiﬁcation of the market structure (monopoly vs competitive, etc) is
needed.
8.1. Contributions
Our approach recognizes that diﬀerent market situations have qualitative diﬀerences that can
be used to guide the strategic and tactical behavior of an agent. Unlike regression-based meth-
ods that try to predict prices directly from demand and other observable factors, our approach
recognizes that prices are also inﬂuenced by non-observable factors, such as the inventory posi-
tions of other agents. Our approach also learns the dynamics and durations of price regimes, and
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when to expect a shift in the dominant regime. This is important information that is diﬃcult
to represent with regression-based methods. For example, regression in an expanding market
(where prices increase) will extrapolate increasing prices using the slope of recent price data. On
the other hand, the regime approach can learn that expansion (or scarcity) regimes are typically
limited in duration and predictably followed by other regimes. When prices are increasing, it
is more important to know if prices will fall by the end of the planning horizon, which can be
invaluable information for a decision maker. Our method can enable an agent to anticipate and
prepare for regime changes, for example by building up inventory in anticipation of better prices
in the future or by selling in anticipation of an upcoming oversupply situation.
8.2. Future directions
Our approach maintains the uncertainty in price prediction by maintaining a price distribu-
tion, which allows an agent to avoid over-committing to risky decisions. We intend to apply our
method in other domains where predicting price distributions appears fruitful, including data
from Amazon.com, eBay.com, and ﬁnancial applications like stock tracking and forecasting.
We have implemented the regime identiﬁcation and prediction method in a TAC SCM agent
and integrated it into the overall decision making process. We are currently using regime pre-
dictions for strategic decision making in the sales component of our agent. We have begun to
design an algorithm that use regime predictions for tactical decision making as well. Ultimately,
we plan to combine probability information supplied by the algorithm with information about
possible consequences of actions to optimize decision making. In particular, we would like to use
the whole regime-based predicted price density to optimize tactical sales pricing by maximizing
expected utility [31].
In addition, we plan to apply we plan to apply reinforcement learning [29] to map economic
regimes to internal operational regimes and operational regimes to actions, such as procurement
and production scheduling. Under operational regimes we understand a state which includes
which actions to take next while knowing the current regime and receiving the regime forecast.
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9. Appendix: Summary of notation
Symbol Definition
np Normalized price
np Mid-range normalized price
n˜pmin Smoothed minimum normalized price
n˜pmax Smoothed maximum normalized price
n˜p Smoothed mid-range normalized price
α Smoothing coeﬃcient
p(np) Density of the normalized price
GMM Gaussian Mixture Model
N Number of Gaussians of the GMM
p(np|ci) Density of the normalized price, np, given i-th Gaussian
of the GMM
µi Mean of i-th Gaussian of the GMM
σi Standard deviation of i-th Gaussian of the GMM
P (ci) Prior probability of i-th Gaussian of the GMM
P (ci|np) Posterior probability of the i-th Gaussian of the GMM
given a normalized price np
η(np) N-dimensional vector with posterior probabilities,
P (ci|np), of the GMM
M Number of regimes
Rk k-th Regime, k = 1, · · · ,M
P(c|r) Conditional probability matrix (N rows and M columns)
resulting from k-means clustering
p(np|Rk) Density of the normalized price np given a regime Rk
P (Rk|np) Probability of regime Rk given a normalized price np
t Current time
t0 Time of last regime change
Tpredict(rt+1|rt) Markov transition matrix
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